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Pro Se
Exclusionary Rule:
Reasonable
Remarks on
Unreasonable
Search and Seizure
By Yale Kamisar
Can we live with the so-called exclu-
sionary rule, which bars the use of il-
legally gained evidence in criminal
trials? Can the Fourth Amendment live
without it?
A growing number of lawyers and
judges, including Chief Justice Warren
Burger, have called for abandonment of
the rule, usually on the ground that it
has not prevented illegal searches and
seizures and on the ground that the rule
has contributed significantly to the in-
crease in crime.
No one has convincingly demon-
strated a causal link between the high
rate of crime in America and the exclu-
sionary rule, and I do not believe that
any persuasive evidence of such a rela-
tionship exists.
In the 1950-59 decade, the decade im-
mediately before the U.S. Supreme
Court imposed the exclusionary rule on
the states as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law, crime increased much fast-
er in many states that admitted illegally
seized evidence than in the District of
Columbia, whose law enforcement of-
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ficers had long been subject to the ex-
clusionary rule.
The Michigan experience is illumi-
nating. The Michigan Constitution con-
tained a so-called anti-exclusionary rule
provision that permitted the use in
evidence of dangerous weapons seized
outside the dwelling house -regardless
of how they were seized. Until this pro-
viso was struck down in 1970, the great
majority of state judges treated it as
valid.
Thus, as a practical matter, until
1970 the police of Michigan were free to
search for and seize firearms of all types
on the street without "probable cause"
or any cause at all.
But from 1961 to 1970, the number of
unregistered handguns increased dra-
matically, firearm robberies doubled,
and homicides committed with firearms
increased fourfold. (In recent years,
both the Michigan homicide rate and
robbery rate have fallen substantially.)
Critics of the exclusionary rule some-
times sound as if it is the main loophole
in the administration of justice. But in
reality it is only a minor escape route in
a system that filters out many more of-
fenders through the discretion of po-
lice, prosecutors, and the courts than it
tries, convicts, and sentences.
In my judgment it would be a grave
mistake to abandon the exclusionary
rule. The Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution says: "The right of
the people to be secure ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated." There are similar
provisions in every state constitution.
We say it, but do we mean it?
The Fourth Amendment's guarantee
does not explicitly say what the conse-
quences of violation should be. In 1914
the Supreme Court set forth the exclu-
sionary rule in Weeks v. United States
in an effort to see that the Fourth
Amendment provision would not be ig-
nored. The exclusionary rule, however,
was applied only to federal prosecu-
tions. It excluded evidence obtained by
federal officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
It was not until 1961, in Mapp v.
Ohio, that the court imposed the rule on
state courts. It had become convinced
that no meaningful alternative had
emerged in the more than 20 states that
still admitted illegally seized evidence.
The Mapp decision is generally re-
garded as the beginning of the Warren
Court's "revolution" in American
criminal procedure. Understandably,
therefore, it, and even the 1914 Weeks
doctrine itself, have become principal
targets of the "counter-revolution" in
American criminal procedure that has
set in since the late 1960s.
The attack on the exclusionary rule
has been led by Chief Justice Burger. At
first, he tempered his sharp criticism of
the rule by pointing out that he would
not welcome its demise until there could
be developed some alternative (such as
an administrative remedy against the
government itself to afford compensa-
tion and restitution for victims of
Fourth Amendment violations).
More recently, however, the chief jus-
tice has expressed a readiness to scrap
the rule without waiting for alternatives
to emerge. For him (and perhaps for a
majority of the present court), the rule
results in "the release of countless guil-
ty criminals" and has become unbear-
able.
Judging from their increasingly
gloomy and bitter dissents, the two
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"holdovers" from the old Warren
Court majority, Justices William Bren-
nan and Thurgood Marshall, fear (and
many Supreme Court watchers are pre-
dicting) that a majority of the present
court will soon abandon the rule alto-
gether, or at least drastically revise it to
provide for exclusion only where the
police have acted not only unlawfully,
but also in "bad faith" or "flagrantly"
or "recklessly."
The exclusionary rule has not had as
great an impact on the police as some
had hoped (and others had feared).
For one thing, the rule has no direct
impact on substantial police activities
directed to ends other than the formal
prosecution and conviction of offend-
ers; for example, harassment, physical
abuse, and unnecessary destruction of
property. This is a good reason to sup-
plement the rule, not to abandon it.
The rule demonstrates to law enforce-
ment officers and to the general public
that the courts are committed to the
principles of the Fourth Amendment so
that when the police themselves break
the law neither they nor any other gov-
ernment agency will be allowed to use
the benefits that flow from the violation.
Otherwise, it would be difficult for the
average citizen-and the average po-
liceman-to believe that the govern-
ment really meant to forbid the conduct
in the first place.
The government's protestations of
disapproval of police illegality cannot
be taken seriously, observed Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous
dissent in the 1928 Olmstead case, "if it
knowingly accepts and pays and an-
nounces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits" of this illegality.
"No distinction," he insisted, "can
be taken between the government as
prosecutor and the government as
judge. If the existing code does not per-
mit district attorneys to have a hand in
such dirty business, it does not permit
the judge to allow such inequities to suc-
ceed."
I doubt that I ever fully appreciated
the force of Holmes's views until about
15 years ago, when an incident occurred
in Minnesota, where I was then teach-
ing. Because Minnesota had admitted
illegally seized evidence until 1961, the
Supreme Court's decision that year
caused much grumbling in police ranks.
At a panel discussion in which I par-
ticipated, the point was made-and per-
haps this is the most basic point of
all-that if the police feared that evi-
dence they were gathering in the cus-
tomary manner would now be excluded,
they must have been violating the guar-
antee against search and seizure all
along. This evoked illuminating re-
sponses from the two law enforcement
officials on the panel.
The Minneapolis city attorney de-
nied that the police had been violating
the law all along; his explanation was
that "the courts of our state were telling
the police all along that the exclusion-
ary rule didn't apply in Minnesota."
This peculiar way of viewing illegal
police conduct was echoed by a St. Paul
detective on the same panel. "No of-
ficer lied upon the witness stand," he
explained. "If you were asked how you
got your evidence, you told the truth.
You had broken down a door or pried
open a window. Oftentimes we picked
locks.... The judiciary okayed it; they
knew what the facts were."
There is no reason to think that the
Minnesota experience is unique. The
heads of the New York City and Los
Angeles police departments, for exam-
ple, also reacted to the adoption of the
exclusionary rule as if the guarantees
against unreasonable search and sei-
zure had just been written.
Are the police not likely to react to the
scrapping of the rule as if the guaran-
tees had just been deleted? Are they not
likely to feel that once again "the
judiciary is okaying it?"
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